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in my dissents in the above cited cases still prevails and
will be invoked in future cases involving will contests so long
as this court remains as it is now constituted.
In my opinion the evidence of testamentary incompetency
is no stronger in this case than it 1vas in any of the cases
which I have hereinbefore cited, which the majority of this
court held, as a matter of law, was insufficient to invalidate the
will involved in those cases, and while a correct conclusion
is reached by the majority in the case at bar, the reasoning
of the majority in arriving at such conclusion is out of harmony with the settled rule with respect to the function and
power of an appellate court to review the determination of
an issue of fact by a trial court.

[L.A. No. 24315.

In Bank.

Mar. 22, 1957.]

THE PEOPLE ex rel. Department of Public Works, Appellant, v. FRED J. RUSSELL, Respondent.
[1] Eminent Domain-Proceedings-Province of Court and Jury.In an eminent domain proceeding the amount of compensation
is to be determined by the jury ( Const., art. I, § 14) ; all other
issues are to be tried by the court, and if it does not make
special findings on those issues they are implicit in the verdict
awarding compensation, which verdict should stand if there
is substantial evidence to support the implied findings.
[2] Streets-Rights of Abutter-Easements.-An abutter's easement of access to a street arises as a matter of law; it is a
property right enjoyed by the abutter as an incident of his
ownership of property, and is separate and distinct from the
right of the general public in and to the street.
[3] Highways-Rights of Abutter-Easements.-An abutter's right
of access to a road extends to a use of the road for purposes
of ingress and egress to his property by such modes of conveyance and travel as are appropriate to the highway and in
'3uch manner as is customary or reasonable; it is more extensive than a mere opportunity to go into the street immediately

fl] See Cal.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, §§ 129, 316; Am.Jur., Eminent Domain, § 316.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Highways and Streets,§ 166 et seq.; Am.Jur..
Highways, § 152 et esq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Eminent Domain, § 161; [2] Streets,
~ 32; [3, 9] Highways,§ 107; [4] Highways, § 62; [5, 6, 8] Highways,§ 53; [7] Dedication,§ 68(5).
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in front of one's property, but does not extend beyond access
to the next interseetion at either Pnd of the street on which
the property abut~, :md any ineonvenienees whieh may be
suffered after such intersection is renehed do not impair the
easpment hut are inconveniences suift•rPd by him as a member
of the public.
Id.-Alteration-Damages.-Highway changes causing diversion of traffic or circuity of travel beyond an intersecting street
nrc not compensable, though the value of nonabutting property
may depreciate as a consequence.
Id.- Condemnation Proceedings- Damages.-HPsults stemming from impron~ments in a state highway on which defendant's propPrty does not nbut nrc not eompensa ble in a
condP11mation proc<•eding im·olving the taking of part of defpndant's property for an adjacc>nt county road.
Id.- Condemnation Proceedings- Severance Damages.-- For
the purpo~e of determining severance dnmages it is immaterial
whether defendant owns the underlying fee in a county road
or has only an easement therein by renson of his ownership
of a butting property, :mel a determination of the particular
rond purposes to whieh a parkway on the oppo~ite side of tlw
road from defendant's property should be put is within the
diseretion of the county.
Dedication-Rights of Public.-\Yith changing conditions of
travel, a city or a county has the right to adapt and appropriate
its highways from time to time to such uses as are within the
tPrms of the dedication and are conducive to the enjoyment
by the public of the highway.
Highways-Condemnation Proceedings-Damages.-The mere
possibility that a parkway on the opposite side of a county
road from defendant's property might have been devoted to
tlw use of Yehicular traffic, should the county so determine, is
too speculative and rPmote to be the basis of an award of
damages for elimination of such parkway, in a condemnation
proeeeding.
!d.-Rights of Abutter.-In the proper exercise of its police
power in the regulation of traffic, a state or county may do
mnny things which are not compensable to an abutting property owner, such as construeting n traffic island, placing dividing strips which deprive an abutter of direct access to the
opposite side of the highway, painting double white lines on
the highway, or designnting the entire street as a one-way
street.

APPEAI1 from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Caryl M. Sheldon, Judge. Modified and
affirmed.
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Condemnation proceedings. .Judgment awarding defendant
damages, modified and affirmed.
George C. Hadley, William E. Fisher, Jr., and Robert F.
Carlson for Appellant.
Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Bourke
Jones, Assistant City Attorney, Peyton H. Moore, ,Jr., and
\Veldon L. Weber, Deputy City Attorneys, as Amici Curiae
011 behalf of Appellant.
Douglas L. Edmonds and Hodge L. Dolle for Respondent.
SHENK, J.-The plaintiff appeals from those portions of
a judgment in condemnation, entered upon a verdict, awarding actual and severance damages for the taking of Parcel 1
as shown by the maps in evidence and arising out of the construction of an improvement in the county road upon which
his property abuts. The property is located in Los Angeles
County.
As shown by the maps, the block in which the defendant's
property is located fronts on a county road known as Firestone
Boulevard and is bounded by Elmcroft and Ringwood Avenues. His property, indicated as Lot 46, does not abut on
those streets. A state highway, also known as Firestone Boulevard, runs parallel and contiguous to the county road in an
east-west direction. Reconstruction of the state highway was
undertaken in order to provide a railway overpass. This
resulted in raising the grade of that highway, the taking of a
portion of the county road right-of-way for the maintenance
of an embankment to support the overpass, the closing of any
ac~cess to the state highway at Ringwood Avenue, and providing for a new access to that highway at Elmcroft, and it required the relocation of the county road. This proceeding
was commenced by the state to obtain an easement for the
latter purpose across Parcels 1 and 2 of the defendant's
property. It was proposed to reconstruct the county road so
as to provide an identical 12-foot width of unimproved parkway adjoining his property, an identical 28-foot width of
paved roadway, complete with curbs and gutters, for two-way
vehicular traffic, and on the same grade as theretofore existed.
The only difference in the proposed improvement was the
elimination of a 12-foot unimproved parkway on the opposite
side of the road from the defendant's property and the consequent diminution of the total right-of-way width of the county
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road from 52 feet to 40 feet. There was no impairment of
access from the defendant's property via the county road to
the next interseeting street in either direction.
'l'hc defendant's property was unimproved at the time of
trial. It had been zoned C-1 for limited commercial use in
1950 at the time the subdivision of which it was a part had
been accepted. At that time it had been contiguous to the
state highway. However, the subdivider had been required
by the county, as a condition to its acceptance of the subdivision map, to dedicate 52 feet adjoining the state highway
for the construction of the county road to be paved and improved with a roadway 28 feet in width, with curbs and
gutters, and a 12-foot unimproved parkway and sidewalk
area on either side. The subdivider was also required to
dedicate 60-foot easements for the construction of Elmcroft
A venue and Ringwood Avenue, to pave 36 feet on Elmcroft
and 40 feet on Ringwood for vehicular use, and to pave
Hingwood to the state highway right-of-way line. Defendant,
who was then an officer in the subdivision company and who
participated in the dedication, later acquired the property in
question. He owns the underlying fee in the county road.
The evidence at the trial consisted principally of the testimony of two expert witnesses Ross and Little for the defendant and two expert witnesses Elliott and Smith for the plaintiff, and a view by the jury and the court of the premises
after the construction of the improvements.
Witness Little testified that the taking of Parcel 1, which
constituted only about 5 per cent of the larger parcel owned
l:Jy the defendant, did not, in his opinion, reduce the value
of the highest and best use to which the remainder of the
defendant's property could be put. There was some variance
in the opinions of the four witnesses as to the fair market
value of this parcel but the parties do not now dispute the
amount of the award made by the jury and the judgment,
namely, $3,848.64. This leaves for consideration on this appeal
the question as to the award of severance damages resulting
from the construction of the improvement.
It was the theory of the plaintiff that the proposed improvement did not impair any legally compensable right of the
defendant; that all of the rights enjoyed by him in connection
with the ownership of his property were appurtenant to the
county road and not to the state highway; that there had
been no impairment of his rights as an abutter on the county
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1·oad to air, light, view, or access; that the diminution in
total right-of-way width by the elimination of the unimproved
parkway across the road did not constitute a substantial impairment of his right of access to and from that road, and that
before the question of the damages to which the defendant
might be entitled for impairment of access to the county
road could be submitted to the jury, the court was required
to determine as a matter of law that there had been a substantial impairment. It was the theory of the defendant, at
the outset of the trial, that he was entitled to compensation
for the loss of access to the state highway at Ringwood A venue
and because of the raising of the grade of that highway.
Pending the ruling of the court evidence was offered to show
that his remaining property had been depreciated in value
the construction of improvements in the state highway.
After deliberation and near to the close of the trial the court
ruled that these were not compensable items of damage and
instructed the jury not to consider them in reaching its verdiet. No claim was asserted as to any loss of impairment of
the defendant's right to air, light or view by the improvement
in the county road.
Each of the defendant's witnesses testified that in their
opinion the highest and best use of the remainder of his
property had been changed from a retail commercial development to a residential development. "'Witness Ross estimated
the severance damages eaused by the reconstruction of the
county road at $69,373, using as the basis for this estimate
the faet that the road in front of the defendant's property
\Yas too narrow for servieing commereial property and that
by the reduction of the total right-of-way width to 40 feet
the road no longer had the potential of an additional paved
width, and he considered 40 feet too narrow for the use
of vehicles of the type used to serve commereial property.
·witness Little estimated the severance damages at $68,034,
using as the basis for his estimate the erection of the state
highway ramp, the closing of the Ringwood Avenue access,
and the inadequacy of a 40-foot street to service eommercial
property. He made no breakdown of these faetors in his
computation. Two of these were later held by the court to
be non-eompensable. When he was asked to consider only
the diminution in right-of-way width in estimating the severance damages, he did not change the amount of his estimate.
Yet when asked if he thought that the closing of Ringwood

48 C.2d-7
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Avenue was an additional reason to persuade a present buyer
that the property was no longer commercial property but
residential property, he replied ''I don't think any buyer
would buy property for commercial property if Ringwood
A venue was closed off.''
It was the contention of the defendant throughout the trial
that the loss sustained by him was not a question of access
but of changing the highest and best use of his property by
the narrowing of the right-of-way, the original width of which
had been established by the local authorities as being necessary
for serving this commercially-zoned property and in which
original width he owned the underlying fee. The trial court
properly treated this as a question of access to the county
road. However it refused to determine as a matter of law that
there had been no substantial impairment of this right, leaving this determination to the jury as a question of fact. The
jury was instructed that the defendant had a private right in
the county road of reasonable access by such modes of conveyance and travel as are appropriate to the highway, and to
a road of a width which was adequate to serve his property,
considering the uses to which it was adapted and available.
If the jury should find in accordance with this definition
that the defendant's right of access had not been substantially
impaired, it was instructed to find that the defendant had
suffered no compensable damage by reason thereof. One of
the jurors asked whether the landowner has the right to say
what can be done with that right-of-way for the use of his
own property, whether he could have paved those 12 feet on
the opposite side of the road, or did that strip of land belong
to the county and had to be reserved for curbs or sidewalks.
After a colloquy between court and counsel, he was informed
that "the area dedicated to the County of Los Angeles for
road purposes may be improved and used for general road
and street purposes which includes pavement, sidewalk area,
curbs, parkway, which ultimate improvement is determined by
the County of Los Angeles according to need of the surrounding area.'' The jury returned a verdict of $33,499.83
for the severance damages for impairment of the defendant's
right of access in and to this county road.
The plaintiff urges that the trial court should have determined as a matter of law from the facts presented that there
had been no substantial impairment of defendant's right of
access to this road; and that the evidence does not disclose any
legally compensable injury suffered by the defendant from
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the county roac1 improvement. The defendant urges that by
its judgment on the verdict the court determined that there
"·as substantial impairment as a matter of law, and that substantial evidenee supports the judgment.
[1] In an eminent domain proceeding the amount of comis to be determined by the jury. ( Const., art. I,
14.) All other issues are to be tried by the court, and if
it does not make speeial findings on those issues they are
implicit in the verdict awarding eompensation. (People v.
Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, 402 [144 P.2d 799] and eases cited.)
rrhe verdict should stand if there is substantial evidence to
support the implied finding.
[2] An abutter's easement of access arises as a matter of
law (Rose v. State, 19 Cal.2d 713 [123 P.2d 505] ). It is a
property right enjoyed by the abutter as an incident of his
o\men:hip of property, and is separate and distinct from the
right of the general public in and to the street. ·while certain
general rules have been set forth in the various decisions which
have considered the nature and scope of this right, eaeh case
must be considered upon its own facts. [3] The right of
access has been defined as extending to a use of the road for
purposes of ingress and egress to his property by such modes
of conveyance and travel as are appropriate to the highway
and in such manner as is customary or reasonable. (Rose v.
State, S1tpra, 19 Cal.2d 713, 728.) It is more extensive than
a mere opportunity to go into the street immediately in front
of one's property. (Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal.2d
343 [144 P.2d 818] .) However it does not extend beyond
access to the next intersection at either end of the street
upon which the property abuts. (Beckham v. City of Stockton, 64 Cal.App.2d 487 r149 P.2d 296].) Any inconveniences
which may be suffered after such intersection is reached do
not impair the easement but are inconveniences suffered by
him as a member of the public. [4] Highway changes eausing div0rsion of traffic or circuity of travel beyond an intersecting street are not compensable. (People v. Ricciardi,
supra, 23 Cal.2d 390, 401-402) even though the value of nonabutting property may depreciate as a consequence thereof.
In those cases in which substantial impairment has been
found as a matter of law from a reduction in ·width of a paved
street or sidewalk area different factual situations were presentccl. In Rose v. State, .mpra, 19 Ca1.2d 713, the elimination
of a grade crossing and the construction of a subway left a
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14-foot lane for two-way vehicular traffic and a 3-foot sidewalk in front of industrial property. In Eaclws v. City of
Los Angeles, 130 Cal. 492 [62 P. 829, 80 Am.St.Rep. 147],
the construction of a street improvement left a 10-foot strip
for vehicular use in front of the plaintiff's property. In Lane
v. San Diego Elec. Ry. Co., 208 Cal. 29 [280 P. 109], an improvement was constructed so close to the plaintiff's premises
that a vehicle could not be parked in front of it while a
streetcar passed by. In McCandless v. City of Los Angeles,
214 Cal. 67 [4 P.2d 139], an improvement was constructed
7 feet from the plaintiff's property line. These may be readily
distinguished from the present case where the parkway adjoining the defendant's property and the paved street area for
vehicular traffic were of exactly the same width and grade and
bore the same relationship to the defendant's property as
theretofore. Any inconvenience to the use of this property for
commercial purpose because of these widths was no greater as
a result of the improvement. [5] Much of the defendant's argument is devoted to a discussion of results stemming from the
improvements in the state highway. His property does not
abut thereon and the court properly ruled that these matters
are not compensable.
[6] For the purpose of determining severance damages
it is immaterial whether the defendant owns the underlying
fee in the county road or has only an easement therein by
reason of his ownership of abutting property. (Eachtts v.
Los Angeles etc. Ry. Co., 103 Cal. 614, 618 [37 P. 750, 42
Am.St.Rep. 149] .) The entire right-of-way had been dedicated
for county road purposes. The determination of the particular road purposes to which the opposite parkway should
be put was within the discretion of the county. The defendant could not have required the county to put it to
any particular road use nor could he have used that strip
for any special purpose of his own inconsistent with the full
enjoyment of the right of way by the public. ( Gttrnscy v.
Northern Calif. Power Co., 160 Cal. 699, 705 [117 P. 906, 36
hR.A.N.S. 185]; Colegrove Water Co. v. City of Hollywood,
151 Cal. 425, 429-430 [90 P. 1053, 13 L.R.A.N.S. 904] ;
Hayes v. Handley, 182 Cal. 273, 282 [187 P. 952]; Airways
Water Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 106 Cal.App.2d 787,
790 [236 P.2d 199] ; People v. Henderson, 85 Cal.App.2d 653,
657 [194 P.2d 91].) [7] With changing conditions of travel,
a city or a county has the right to adapt and appropriate its
highways from time to time to such uses as are within the
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terms of the dedication and are conducive to the enjoyment
by the public of the highway. ( W attson v. Eldridge, 207
Cal. 314 [278 P. 236]; Airways Water Co. v. County of Los
Angeles, sltpra, 106 Cal.App.2d 787, 790.) [8] The mere
possibility that the opposite parkway might have been devoted to the use of vehicular traffic, should the county so
determine, was too speculative and remote to be the basis of
an award of damages. ( Cf. City of Los Angeles v. Geiger,
94 Cal.App.2d 180, 192 [210 P.2d 717].)
[9] In the proper exercise of its police power in the regulation of traffic, a state or county may do many things which
are not compensable to an abutting property owner, such as
constructing a traffic island, placing permanent dividing strips
which deprive an abutter of direct access to the opposite side
of the highway, painting double white lines on the highway,
or designating the entire street as a one-way street. (jVcDonald
v. State, 130 Cal.App.2d 793, 799 [279 P.2d 777] ; People v.
Sayig, 101 Cal.App.2d 890 [226 P.2d 702] ; Holman v. State,
97 Cal.App.2d 237 [217 P.2d 448]; Beckham v. C1"ty of Stockton, 64 Cal.App.2d 487 [149 P.2d 296].) Amici curiae urge
that the use of the parkway as a traffic separation strip
between the state highway and the county road is proper
in the control of traffic, and as such presents no valid claim
for damages. Under the factual situation here presented this
contention is sustained.
No substantial impairment of the defendant's right of access to the county road is disclosed by the evidence and the
eourt should have instructed the jury to that effect. Any finding of the court to the contrary implied from the fact that
the question of severance damages was submitted to the jury
is not supported by the evidence.
In view of what has been said other contentions raised on
appeal need not be discussed.
The judgment awarding damages for the taking of Parcell
is affirmed. The judgment is modified by striking therefrom
the award for severance damages for the taking of Parcel 1.
As so modified the judgment is affirmed; the defendant to
recover costs on appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, ,J., and Spence, ,J., eoncnrred.
SCHAUER, J.-In my view the opinion prepared for the
District Court of Appeal by Justice Fourt and concurred in
by Presiding Justice White and Justice Doran (reported in
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(Cal.App.) 299 P.2d 920) adequately discusses and correctly
resolves the questions presented on this appeal. For the
reasons therein stated I would affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
McComb, .J., concurred.
CARTER, ,J.-I dissent.
When this case was before the District Court of Appeal,
Second Appellate District, Division One, an opinion was prepared by l\fr. Justice Fourt affirming the judgment of the
trial court. 'fhis opinion was concurred in by Mr. Presiding
Justice White and by l\fr. Justice Doran. The views expressed
in said opinion are in accord with my concept of the law on
this subject and I adopt said opinion as my dissenting opinion
from the majority opinion herein.
''This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment in a
condemnation action wherein the defendant was awarded
severance damages in the sum of $33,499.83.
'' 'l'he action was brought to acquire an easement for public
road and highway purposes over property described in the
complaint. The complaint alleges that the parcel to be taken
is a part of a larger parcel and the prayer asks that damages
incidental to the taking be ascertained and assessed. The
answer admits that the parcel to be taken is only a part of a
larger parcel and alleges that the taking and the construction
of the improvement cause a damage. The issue of damages is
therefore joined by the pleadings of the parties.
''The parcel to be taken was unimproved, about 287 feet in
length and varied in width from 6 feet to 28 feet and was
about 5,064 square feet in area. That parcel was a part of a
larger parcel all owned by the defendant. The larger parcel
was generally rectangular in shape with an area of about
105,000 square feet. The entire property in question was
zoned for commercial usage, fronting and abutting upon the
north side of a county road called Firestone Boulevard, hereinafter referred to as the County road. The County road
consisted of a dedicated right of way 52 feet in width, of
which the center 28 feet had been paved allowing for vehicular
and other travel in both directions and complete with curbs
and gutters on each side. The County road ran parallel to, and
adjoined on the south side, State Highway Route Number
174, also known as Firestone Boulevard, hereinafter referred
to as the State highway. There was no connection or paved
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crossover between the State highway and the County road
along their common boundary. Pigure 1 illustrates the 'before' position and measurements of the defendant's property
and its relationship to the roadways. Pigure 2 illustrates the
'after' position and measurements of the defendant's property and its relationship to the road1Yays. (See post, pages
200 and 201.)
'' 'rhe relocation of the County road was necessitated by the
widening of the State highway for the construction of a railroad overpass. The reconstruction of the County road resulted in the elimination of a 12-foot strip on the south side
of the County road. In other words, the County road was reduced from 52 feet to 40 feet in width, or a reduction of about
i1yenty-three (23) per cent, although the paved portion of
the road remained the same. In addition, a paved connection
between the County road and the State highway was constructed where Elmcroft A venue and the State high·way conn ret.
''The evidence indicated that respondent's damages were
not based upon any loss of light, air or view with respect to
the County road, thereby resolving the matter to the question
of loss or impairment of access.
''Appellant asserts that the sole question presented by
this appeal is whether the trial court erred in not ruling as a
matter of law that respondent's easement of access in and to
the abutting County road had not been substantially impaired. It is appellant's contention that since the uncontradicted evidence showed that the road had been reconstructed in exactly the same relationship to the land as to
the grade, width of roadway, and intervening parkway strip.
the only difference being the elimination of an unimproved
J 2 foot wide strip on the other side of the County road SP])arating and dividing that road from a heavily traveled State
highway, there was no substantial loss or impairment of re~-;pondent 's right of access.
''The property in question was a part of a subdivision
known as Tract Number 16767, apparently developed in about
1950. The political subdivision having control of subdivisions
at that time imposed certain conditions and requirements on
the subdividers, among such conditions and requirements
being that a road (the County road here) 52 feet in width be
dedicated to the county; that, at the property owners' expense, it be paved with a roadway 28 feet in width. that it br
provided with curbs and gutters and that a 12 foot parkway
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Figure 1-Before Construction.

and sidewalk area be provided on each side of the paved and
curbed roadway. The subdivision map was recorded on
October 31, 1950. Apparently, the subdividers complied substantially with all of the conditions and requirements made by
the political subdivisions concerned with the property.
"As stated in Bacick v. Board of Contra~, 23 Cal.2d 343,
at pages 349-350 [144 P.2d 818] : 'It has long been recognized in this state and elsewhere that an owner of property
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Figure 2-After Construction.

abutting upon a public street has a property right in the
nature of an easement in the street which is appurtenant to
his abutting property and which is his private right, as distinguished from his right as a member of the public. That
right has been described as an easement of ingress and egress
to and from his property or, generally, the right of access
over the street to and from his property, and compensation
must be given for an impairment thereof.'
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''Also, in People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, the court
stated, at page 397 l144 P.2d 799]: 'The courts of this state,
from time immemorial and in cases too numerous to mention,
have declared and enforced the abutting property owner's
right to a free and convenient use of and access to the highway on which his property abuts. (Citing cases.) It was
declared in the case of Eachus v. Los Angeles etc. By. Co.,
supra, 103 Cal. 614 [37 P. 570, 42 Am.St.Hep. 149], at p. 617,
that this right of ingress and egress attaches to the lot and
is a right of property as fully as is the lot itself and any
act by which that easement is destroyed or substantially impaired for the benefit of the public, is a damage to the lot itself,
within the meaning of the constitutional provision under
which the owner is entitled to compensation.
'' 'It is also the settled law that ''An abutting owner has
two kinds of rights in a highway, a public right which he
enjoys in common with all other citizens, and certain private
rights which arise from his ownership of property contiguous
to the highway, and which are not common to the public
generally; . . . An abutting landowner on a public highway
has a special right of easement and user in the public road for
access purposes, and this is a property right which cannot be
damaged or taken away from him without due compensation.
[Citing cases.]" (Lane v. San Diego Elec. By. Co., 208 Cal.
29, 33 [280 P. 109] .) '
"In Bose v. State, 19 Cal.2d 713, at pages 727-728 [123
P.2d 505], the court said: "l'he abutting owner's easement of
access arises as a matter of law . . . and its nature and extent
have been set forth in the numerous decisions which have
considered the question. Thus, it is established that the easement of access is a matter of law peculiar to the individual
owner, and an unreasonable interference with such an easement is an injury necessarily different from the injury suffered by the general public . . . . It is an easement in the
public highway upon which his land fronts. (Citing cases.)
The right extends to a use of the highway for purposes of
ingress and egress to his property by such modes of conveyance and travel as are appropriate to the highway and in such
manner as is customary or reasonable. (See Lewis, Eminent
Domain (3d ed.), p. 190.) '
''The appellant here contends that the right of access does
not extend to the full width of the dedicated right-of-way,
but only to the paved portion thereof and that therefore there
was no substantial loss or impairment of respondent's right

Mar. 1957]

PEOPLE

v.

RussELL

203

148 C.2d 189; 309 P.2d 10 I

aecess since a duplicate paved portion of equal size has
been provided.
''In support of its contentions appellant cites Rose v. State,
supra; Beckham v. City of Stockton, 64 Cal.App.2d 487 [149
P.2d 296]; McDonald v. State, 130 Cal.App.2d 793 [279
P.2<l 777]; Brown v. Board of S1tpervisors, 124 Cal. 274 [57
P. 82], and Bigley v. N1Inan, 53 Cal. 403.
''All of the cited cases are distinguishable from the case
now before us. In the Beckham case the complainant owned
property, no part of which was taken for construction, and
which \Yas beyond the intersection and within the first block
from the street in question. In the construction an underpass was made and as a result thereof claimants could no longer
go directly from their property across the next intersecting
street and to the downtown area. The court held that mere
inconvenience and circuity of travel beyond an intersecting
street resulting from the construction of an improvement
therein do not furnish a basis for recovery of damages by
landowners whose properties abut on a street which intersects the street on which the improvement is constructed;
that in order for the landowner to recover there must be an
infringement of some right which he possesses in connection
with his property; and such property right is that of reasonable use of the street fronting the property in either direction to the next interseetion. Such right the plaintiffs still had.
''In the McDonald case, plaintiffs claimed damages becausr
they formerly passed directly across the county road, upon
which their property fronted, to and into a state highway
which lay next to and parallel with the county road. The state
had constructed a wall 11 feet inside of the county road thus
making· direct passage to the state highway impossible, and
necessitating travel on the county road to the next intersecting street before the state highway could be entered. A
drmurrer to the second amended complaint was sustained because the pleadings showed that appellants did not own
property abutting on the state highway and did not have
direct access thereto. The appellate court stated, at page 797:
'However, appellants do not complain of the fact that the wall
1vas placed within the original surface area of the county
road rather than upon its eommon boundary with the state
higlrway. 'rhey claim only that their abutters' rights in the
state highway have been damaged . . . . Thus, the real issue
presented is whether or not the appellants, upon the construction of tho state highway, ipso facto aequired a right to have
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no barrier erected between said state highway and that portion
of Plumas Street (county road) upon which their properties
abutted.'
"Brown v. Board of Supervisors, sttpra, 124 Cal. 27 4,
merely holds that the narrowing of a street is not ipso facto
an impairment of the right of access. The board of supervisors
of the city and county of San Francisco passed an order declaring the northerly 31 feet of Turk Street to be closed and
vacated. The owner of the lands abutting upon the southerly
side of the street instituted proceedings for a review of the
action of the board and a judgment anulling the order upon
the ground that in adopting it the board acted in excess of
its jurisdiction. The court held that the act of the board was
a legislative act performed in the exercise of a discretionary
power intrusted to them as a legislative body and that it was
not the exercise of any judicial function which may be reviewed upon certiorari. In answer to the contention that
the board had no jurisdiction to adopt the order without at
the same time providing for an assessment of damage that
would be sustained thereby and providing for its payment,
the court stated, at pages 280-281 : 'The property which an
abutting owner has in the street in front of his land is the
right of access and of light and air, and for an infringement
of these rights he is entitled to compensation . . . . The appellants herein do not, however, claim that the reduction in
the width of the street will in any respect interfere with their
enjoyment of light and air, or that acce:;;s to their lots is in
any degree impaired. . . . The damage which the appel1ants
may sustain by reason of a diminution in value of their
lands is not damage for which they are entitled to compensation. (Citing cases.) '
"Bigley v. Nunan, supra, 53 Cal. 403, was not a condemnation proceeding but was an action to abate a nuisance caused
by the erection of a fence in the highway in front of plaintiff's
property, and for damages. The access from the plaintiff's
lot to the street had not been cut off or impeded. The court
held that if plaintiff and his immediate neighbors had more
occasion to pass through the street than the public at large,
this was an inconvenience in degree only and was not an injury in kind different from that sustained by the public; that
the nuisance may be abated or removed, and to give damages
on account of the decreased value of the land would be to give
damages for all the injury the premises would ever sustain,
which would be clearly wrong.
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''In a majority of the cases in other jurisdictions the right
an owner of property to compensation for damages suffered by the narrowing of a street in front of his premises
has been sustained, even where the portion vacated is on the
side of the street. (18 Am.Jur. 860; 49 A.L.R. 1255.)
In City of Tttlsa v. Hindman, 128 Okla. 169 [261 P. 910, 55
A.I,.R. 891], it was held that where a city widens or opens a
street for automobile and motor-truck traffic to its entire
thereby consuming all space theretofore assigned and
set apart for sidewalks or foot roads, it is liable to abutting
property owners for any consequential damages resulting to
such property.
"In Fry v. O'Leary, 141 Wash. 465 [252 P. 111, 49 A.L.R.
1249], the south 13 feet of a street were vacated over the
protests of the landowners whose property abutted the opposite side. 'l'he court in holding that the resulting damage
was compensable, stated, at page 113 [252 P.]: 'We think
it also clear under the uniform weight of authority that one
who is an abutting property owner upon a street or alley,
any portion or the whole of which is sought to be vacated,
has a special right and a vested interest in the right to use
the whole of the street for ingress and egress, light, view, and
air, and, if any damages are suffered by such an owner, compensation is recoverable therefor. It follows therefore, that
if appellants' light, air, view, or access is materially diminished, as alleged in the complaint, they are entitled to have
the same passed upon by a jury regularly impaneled to determine the amount thereof. Ridgway v. City of Osceola, 139
Iowa 590 [117 N.W. 974].
'' 'Respondents contend that the vested interest of an
abutting property owner in a street extends only to the middle
of the street, and that therefore appellants are not abutting
property owners as to the 13 feet vacated, which is across the
street. But this position is untenable. Carried to its logical
conclusion, the council could vacate all the street opposite
appellants' property, leaving but a 30-foot street, and still
appellants have no cause for complaint because not abutting
owners. Yet there can be no doubt that, under most circumstances, property on a street only 30 feet in width would not
be as valuable as on one twice as wide, for there would be only
half as much space for light, air, view, and means of access.
An abutting property owner's vested interest is to the full
width of the street in front of his land, and he is entitled to
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use the whole thereof for egress and ingress, light, air, and
view, and for any substantial or material diminution of any
of these rights he is entitled t,o recover in damages.'
"Appellant further contends that the trial court, as a
matter of law, must make a finding as to whether the abutter's
rights of access have been substantially impaired, prior to
submitting the matter to the jury. It is true that it is within
the province of the trial court, and not the jury, to pass
upon the question whether under the facts presented the
abutting landowner's right of access will be substantially
impaired. However, this the trial court did when it ruled
on the admission of evidence and in its instructions to the
jury. Also, if the court does not make special findings on
the issue its findings thereon are implicit in the verdict
awarding compensation. (People v. Ricciardi, supra, 23
Cal.2d 390.)
''Two witnesses testified for respondent and each stated
that it was his opinion that there was a damage to the remaining parcel. One witness stated that it was his opinion that
such damage was $69,373, and the other testified that it was
his opinion the damage was $68,034. Each testified that by
reason of the relocation and construction of the county road
the highest and best use of respondent's property had changed
from a retail commercial development to a residential development. The court and jury viewed the property, the area
and the constructed improvement. 'rhe trial judge was in a
position to and, in our opinion, he did fairly exercise his
discretionary power. His view of the property and of the
construction by the state is independent evidence to support
the determination or finding implicit in the verdict that an
impairment of access existed. (Neel v. Mannings, Inc., 19
Cal.2d 647, 654 [122 P.2d 576]; Wheeler v. Gregg, 90 Cal.
App.2d 348, 366 [203 P.2d 37] ; City of Oakland v. Adams,
37 Cal.App. 614, 617 [174 P. 947]; Hatton v. Gregg, 4 Cal.
App. 537, 540-541 [88 P. 592] .) In the case of Cottnty of
San Diego v. Bank of America, 135 Cal.App.2d 143, at page
149 [286 P.2d 880], the court stated as follows: 'It is the rule
in California that in a condemnation action, in absence of a
showing of passion or prejudice, the finding of a jury when
supported by substantial evidence \vill not be set aside on
appeal. (Citing cases.)'
"Also, in Rose v. State, st~pra, 19 Cal.2d 713, at pages 728729, the court said : 'It is well settled that where there is evidence to support a finding that substantial and unreasonable
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with tl1e land-crwner's easement of access or
of ingress and egress has been caused as the result of an
ob:struction in the street or highway on which his property
ab !its, an appellate court will not say as a matter of law that
sneh finding is erroneous. ( 0 'Connor v. Sonthern Pac. Co.,
22 Cal. 681
P. 688]; Smith v. Southern Pac. Co., 146
Cal. Hi4 [79 P. 868, 106 .Am.St.Hep. 17]; Fairchild v. Oakland
Bay Shore Ry. Co., 176 Cal. 629 [169 P. 388].)
'' 'The issues before the trial court in the case at bar were,
·whether plaintiffs' rights of access to Jackson Street was
substantially and unreasonably impaired by the construction
of the snbway, and if so, the amount of damage suffered as the
resnlt of such interference. These matters are for the trier
of the facts and only where the evidence does not support a
fincl ing of substantial and unreasonable interference should
the conrt decide the issue as a matter of law.'
"The case of Anderson v. State, 61 Cal..App.2d 140 [142
P.2d 88], holds that the view alone will support a verdict if
it is within the range of testimony. The trial court heard the
1estimony of all witnesses, received and examined all exhibits,
yieiYed the property, and reweighed the evidence before denying appellant's motion for new triaL (See People v. Aclamgon, 118 Cal.App.2d 714, 725 [258 P.2d 1020].)
''Appellant further contends that there were errors of la-w
Hmnnitted which were prejudicial to it. It is claimed that
the testimony of the witness Little for the respondent should
lutn' been stricken. The substance of the testimony of the
1Yitness \Yas that before the construction the remaining property was adapted to commercial activities and that after the
reduction of the street the remaining property was no longer
commercial ; that the county road is now too narrow to service
a commercial development and that the remaining property
eannot now be utilized for commercial activities and is therefore less valuable. The testimony was proper and the motion
to strike it \Yas properly denied. Substantially the same
situation prevailrd as to the testimony of respondent's witness Hoss.
"It is our conclusion that there was ample evidence to
support the judgment and there was no prejudicial error to
appellant.''
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was drnird April17,
HlG7. Cartrr, .T.. Schaner, .T., and McComb, .T., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.

